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Abstract—Nowadays, in operating systems, numerous protec-
tion mechanisms prevent or limit the user-mode applications
to access the kernel’s internal information. This is regularly
carried out by software-based defenses such as Address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Kernel ASLR
(KASLR). They play pronounced roles when the security of
sandboxed applications such as Web-browser are considered.
Armed with arbitrary write access in the kernel memory,
if these protections are bypassed, an attacker could find a
suitable where to write in order to get an elevation of privilege
or maliciously execute codes in ring 0.
In this paper, we introduce a reliable method based
on Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) side-
channel attacks to reveal the address of the Global Descriptor
Table (GDT) and Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT). We
indicate that by detecting these addresses, an attack could
be executed to sidestep the Intel’s User-Mode Instruction
Prevention (UMIP) and the Hypervisor-based mitigation
and, consequently, neutralized them. The introduced attack
is successfully performed after the most recent patches
for Meltdown and Spectre. Moreover, the implementation
of the proposed attack on different platforms, including
the latest releases of Microsoft Windows, Linux, and, Mac
OSX with the latest 9th generation of Intel processors,
shows that the attack is independent from the Operating
System implementation. We demonstrate that a combination
of this method with call-gate mechanism (available in modern
processors) in a chain of attacks will eventually lead to a
full system compromise despite the limitations of a super-
secure sandboxed environment in the presence of Windows’s
proprietary Virtualization Based Security (VBS). Finally, we
suggest the software-based mitigation to avoid these attacks
with an acceptable cost.
Index Terms—Cache Attack, Microarchitectural Side Chan-
nel, TSX, Meltdown, KASLR
1. Introduction
As signs of progress in computer science, from Artifi-
cial Intelligence [1] to High-Performance Computing [2]
continues, the role of computer security in both hardware
and software is drawing more attention to the research
community. Recently discovered microarchitectural vul-
nerabilities in modern CPUs, are known to be devastating.
They are easy-to-implement, practical, and almost inde-
pendent from the operating system, which makes them
an imminent threat to computer privacy. Among them,
speculative-execution based and side-channel attacks are
more ubiquitous as new disclosures continue to increase
scrutiny by researchers in this field [3]. These attacks are
capable of circumventing all existing protective measures,
such as CPU microcode patches, kernel address space
isolation (Kernel Virtual Address (KVA), shadowing, and
Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI)). While side-channel
attacks have been well-known for a relatively long time,
speculative-execution based attacks are contemporary, and
pieces of evidence indicate that they will persist for some
time in the future.
Pioneered by Meltdown [4] and Spectre [5] attacks,
numerous variations, and extension of microarchitecture
vulnerabilities have been found, and their corresponding
exploitation has proposed latterly. ForeShadow [6], MDS
[7], and ZombieLoad [8] should be alluded as the most
famous ones. Moreover, new works have shown the ex-
tensiveness of these attacks. As an example, NetCAT [9]
presents a practical network-based side-channel attack.
After Meltdown, more strict KASLRs such as
KAISER [10] have been employed in today’s operating
systems to prevent similar attacks since short-term hard-
ware mitigation is not effortlessly attainable. KAISER
completely isolates the user-mode and kernel-mode mem-
ory layout by creating a Shadow representation of the
mapped memory. However, there are still some unpro-
tected addresses and parts by KALSR that required by the
architecture. Hence, knowing these structure’s addresses
could lead to severe problems.
In addition, discovered hardware-based vulnerabilities
on Memory (DRAM) such as RowHammer [11] allow
attackers to execute more destructive and offensive ma-
licious code, to trespass or gain access to restricted and
private information [12].
Furthermore, it is possible and suitable to take ad-
vantage of some hardware-specific structures that are un-
doubtedly implemented across operating systems. In the
same way, to gather masked and hidden internal informa-
tion of the operating system could be used for malicious
purposes. To be more precise, the structures of Global De-
scriptor Table (GDT) and Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)
are one of the essential parts of protected mode, which
are not heavily isolated in the user-mode and kernel-
mode address layout. By overwriting these structures in
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certain conditions, one can perform a privilege escalation
attack. Also, by the use of the same variations of timing
side-channel attacks as in Meltdown,( e.g., TSX-based
attacks), the virtual addresses of these structures in the
kernel memory could be revealed.
In this work, we demonstrate that GDT and IDT
addresses could be discovered by TSX side-channel to
perform privilege escalation attacks, even after Meltdown
mitigation, bypassing the mitigations in modern Intel
processors, particularly User-Mode Instruction Prevention
(UMIP). Furthermore, it is illustrated that the proposed
attacks can be executed in virtualized environments, such
as the latest Microsoft Hypervisor release (Hyper-v) and
Virtualization Based Security (VBS). In summary, the
contributions of this paper are as follow:
• A TSX side-channel attack is performed to dis-
cover GDT and IDT addresses in the kernel mode
in a system with KAISER isolated memory layout
bypassing UMIP.
• A full system compromise could be achieved by
revealing GDT and IDT virtual addresses in the
memory, incorporated with call-gate mechanism
along with a conventional Write What Where.
• The possible mitigation investigated for this vul-
nerability and low-cost software-based mitigation
for the operating systems to avert these attacks is
suggested.
In the rest of the article, first, the necessary back-
ground information for the proposed attack, including a
study on KASLR, Meltdown attack,Virtualization Base
Security, KAISER, and other related concepts is provided
in Section 2. GDT and call-gate Mechanism are explained
in detail in section 3. In the section 4, Intel’s UMIP
is analyzed and described. Section 5 presents the attack
implementation and experimental details by taking advan-
tage of some exploitation methods. Possible mitigation for
this vulnerability is discussed in section 6. Finally, other
related works are noted and briefly investigated in section
7. The paper is summarized and concluded in section 8.
2. Background
In this section, required preliminaries and background
for the software-based side-channel attacks, address space
switching, along with some concepts of Translation
Lookaside Buffer (TLB), Virtualization Based Security
(VBS) have been provided. Moreover, additional mate-
rials on VM-Execution Controls, KAISER, Virtual Ma-
chine Control Structure (VMCS), TSX side channels, and
Descriptor-Table Exiting are presented.
2.1. KASLR and Meltdown
The security of computer systems fundamentally re-
lies on memory isolation, e.g., kernel address ranges are
marked as non-accessible or, protected from user access.
ASLR is a well-known technique to make exploitation
harder by placing various objects randomly rather than
using fixed addresses. It helps to ensure that memory
addresses associated with running processes on systems
are not predictable. Therefore, flaws or vulnerabilities
associated with these processes will be more challenging
to exploit. Discovered Meltdown [4] attack was able to
exploit side effects of out-of-order execution on modern
processors to read arbitrary kernel memory locations, in-
cluding personal data and passwords. By exploiting the
out-of-order execution as an indispensable performance
feature, the attack is independent of the operating sys-
tem, and it does not rely on any software vulnerabilities.
Meltdown breaks all security guarantees provided by ad-
dress space isolation as well as paravirtualized environ-
ments and all of security mechanisms building upon this
foundation. On the affected systems, Meltdown enables
an adversary to read the memory of other processes or
virtual machines in the cloud without any permissions or
privileges, affecting millions of customers and virtually
every user of a personal computer [4].
2.2. Post Meltdown Patches
Generally, Meltdown mitigation relies on isolating
kernel and user memory pages with different methods.
The widely used approach to address this issue is the
employment of KAISER [10], which is implemented as
Kernel Virtual Address Shadow (KVAS) (a term coined
by Microsoft) [13] in Microsoft Windows and KPTI in
Linux [14].
Conventionally, before Meltdown, each process was
equipped with a single set of page tables. KAISER [10]
proposes the implementation of two sets of page tables.
One set is virtually unchanged and mapped when the
process is in kernel mode. So, it includes both user-
mode and kernel-mode memory sections. The second set
(CR3) contains a copy of all of the user-space mappings
but leaves out the kernel side. Instead, there is a small
(minimal) set of kernel-space mappings that provides the
minimum required information to the processor. This im-
plementation of the dual page table prevents the adversary
from gathering information regarding the kernel-space
memory mapping scheme, avoiding further kernel-side
exploitation. The concept of implementing KAISER is
depicted in Figure 1 below:
Kernel Space Kernel Space
Kernel Space
User Space User Space User Space
User Mode
Kernel Mode User ModeKernel Mode
System Without
KAISER
System Protected with
KAISER
Figure 1. KAISER protection overview before and after Meltdown Patch
As shown in Figure 1, placing a small portion of
information in the user-mode is inevitable since operating
systems are required to implement functions necessary
to handle system calls and interrupts, which are directed
to kernel space. Consequently, these shadowing functions
change the base pointer for paging (e.g., CR3) for a new
page table.
A similar mechanism has been introduced and imple-
mented in Microsofts updates with regards to Meltdown
based attacks in the KVAS. This feature effectively blocks
the Meltdown attack, as it mislay a reasonably small
portion of the kernel memory accessible to user-mode
code. In this system, the memory is partitioned into three
parts: Entries, Arbitrary Control Flow, and Exits. The key
insight in this mechanism is that the kernel space and
the user space are separated owing to advanced paging
structures. Only minimal numbers of pages are mapped in
both the user and the kernel spaces. As a result, even if a
Meltdown attack is successful, it could not be used to leak
kernel memory. That is due to swapping in address spaces
by entries and exits, which leads to exclusive access to
kernel space only by the kernel code. Another benefit of
this design is to achieve its goal simply by manipulating
the paging structures without having to rely on any extra
support at the hardware level (e.g., microcode updates).
As will be discussed, leaving the tables which hold the
addresses of interrupt handler (e.g., Interrupt Descriptor
Table) or other tables managing the segmentation (e.g.,
GDT) visible to user mode, and ignoring to protect their
addresses, allow the attacker to endanger the system.
However, to adversely take advantage of the information
left unprotected in the user-mode, essential internal mech-
anisms should be known which will be explored later.
2.3. Address Space Switch
On an address-space switch, as occurs on a process
switch but not on a thread switch, some TLB entries can
become invalid since the virtual-to-physical mapping is
different. The most straightforward strategy to deal with
this is to flush the TLB thoroughly. It means that after
a switch, the TLB is empty, and any memory reference
will be a miss, so it would be some time before things
are running back at full speed. Newer CPUs use more
effective strategies marking. It means that if a second
process runs for only a short time and jumps back to a
first process, it may still have valid entries, saving time to
reload them.
Since the 2010 Westmere microarchitecture Intel 64
processors also support 12-bit process-context identifiers
(PCIDs) [15], which permit retaining TLB entries for
multiple linear-address spaces, with only those that match
the current PCID used for address translation. [16] [17]
In Figure 2 the interconnection between different parts of
caches like TLB (ITLB, STLB) and Shared Caches (L1,
L2, L3) in Intel’s SkyLake microarchitecture is illustrated.
While selective flushing of the TLB is an option in
software-managed TLBs, the only option in some hard-
ware TLBs (e.g., the TLB in the prior Intel processors)
is the complete flushing of the TLB on an address-space
switch. [18]
Memory isolation is especially critical during switches
between the privileged operating system kernel process
and the user processes as was highlighted by the Melt-
down security vulnerability. Mitigation strategies such as
KPTI rely heavily on performance-impacting TLB flushes
Figure 2. Interconnection details in Intel SkyLake microarchitecture [4]
and benefit significantly from hardware-enabled selective
TLB entry management such as PCID.
2.4. Virtualization Base Security (VBS)
Virtualization-based security, or VBS, uses hardware
virtualization features to create and isolate a secure region
of memory from the standard operating system. Windows
can use the virtual secure mode to host several security
solutions, providing them with significantly increased pro-
tection from vulnerabilities in the operating system and
preventing the use of malicious exploits that attempt to
defeat protections.
VBS uses the Windows hypervisor to create secure
virtual mode and to enforce restrictions which protect the
vital system and operating system resources, or to protect
security assets such as authenticated user credentials. With
the increased protections offered by VBS, even if malware
gains access to the operating system kernel, the possible
exploits can be notably limited and contained, because the
hypervisor can prevent the malware from executing code
or accessing platform secrets.
One such example security solution is Hypervisor-
Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI) [19], which uses VBS to
strengthen code integrity policy enforcement significantly.
Kernel-mode code integrity checks all kernel-mode drivers
and binaries before they started, and prevents unsigned
drivers or system files from being loaded into system
memory. The presence of this feature can mitigate the
execution of LGDT, LIDT, LLDT, LTR, SGDT, SIDT,
SLDT, and STR, so GDT and SDT not included to address
leak to either operating system kernel-mode (ring 0) and
user-mode (ring 3). These leaks can be prevented by
using the second bit of Secondary Processor-Based VM-
Execution Controls.
2.5. Secondary Processor-Based VM-Execution
Controls
In order to control our guest features, we have to
set some fields in our Virtual Machine Control Struc-
ture (VMCS), which is a hardware-defined structure that
controls the behavior and settings of each guest virtual
machine (VM).
This data structure is located in memory and exists
once per (current) VM, which is managed by the Vir-
tual Machine Monitor (VMM). With every change of the
execution context between different VMs, the VMCS is
restored for the current VM, defining the state of the VMs
virtual processor and VMM control Guest software using
VMCS.
The VMCS consists of six logical groups:
• Guest-State Area: Processor state saved into the
guest state area on VM exits and loaded on VM
entries.
• Host-State Area: Processor state loaded from the
host state area on VM exits.
• VM-Execution Control Fields: Fields controlling
processor operation in VMX non-root operation.
• VM-Exit Control Fields: Fields that control VM
exits.
• VM-Entry Control Fields: Fields that control
VM entries.
• VM-Exit Information Fields: Read-only fields
to receive information on VM exits describing the
cause and the nature of the VM exit.
Secondary Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls
[20], which is a member of VMCS along with Primary
Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls fields [21] con-
trol these features that can be modified using VMWRITE
instruction. Several features described above control the
presence and absence of sundry instructions and security
mechanisms and behavior of guests when, for example, a
particular instruction is executed. Among the mentioned
features, Descriptor-Table Exiting is considered in this
work. If this control bit is set, then the guest is no longer
able to execute instructions such as LGDT, LIDT, LLDT,
LTR, SGDT, SIDT, SLDT, and STR directly into VMX
non-root mode [22]. In this situation, instead, a VM-Exit
occurs, and then, it is the responsibility of VMM to handle
the results to the guest. The VMM could decide whether
to return a valid or invalid result to the guest, accordingly.
This controlling feature could be used as a mitigation to
avoid these data leaks to the user-mode or kernel-mode. In
the suggested scenario, we show that our proposed attack
is independent of the returned results from SGDT, SIDT,
SLDT, and STR, and would not cause a VM-exit [23].
2.6. Integrity Levels in Windows
Beginning with Windows Vista operating system, the
Windows integrity mechanism improved the security ar-
chitecture by defining a new access control entry (ACE)
type to represent an integrity level in an object’s security
descriptor.
The security descriptor is a data structure containing
the security information associated with a securable ob-
ject. In Windows, contrary to Linux, one could read kernel
addresses using a popular function called NtQuerySys-
temInformation. It is due to the fact that, in Windows,
KASLR is not a boundary against local attackers with
unconstrained execution. Therefore, it is meaningless if
an adversary application is executed in Integrity Level
(which is equally or more protected than Medium Level).
despite of the multiple options to exploit Windows kernel,
Integrity Levels are designed to prevent untrusted sources
from accessing kernel addresses. For example, applica-
tions with Low or Untrusted integrity levels such as Web-
browsers are prevented from reading these addresses.
This is a defense mechanism in fundamental design
to protect operating system kernel, and it is imperative to
protect other applications with different levels of trust to
be isolated from each other (e.g., User Interface Privilege
Isolation (UIPI) [24]). In our attack senario, we demon-
strate how to find the address of GDT from a low-integrity
application. In our representation, we inject our work
(DLL) into the Microsoft Edge (bypassing some DLL-
injection protections) to test our samples. Furthermore,
There are no similar mechanism to integrity-level in other
operating systems. They instead use account-level policies
to restrict a malicious application from affecting other
parts of applications.
2.7. Descriptor-Table Exiting
Descriptor-Table Exiting is a hardware mechanism
to restrict guest machines in VMX Non-Root from ex-
ecuting instructions such as LGDT, LIDT, LLDT, LTR,
SGDT, SIDT, SLDT, and STR. This mechanism has been
used in Microsoft Virtualization Based Security as exploit
mitigation, which avoids memory address leakage and
provides an absurd situation for the attacker to find the
base address of GDT or IDT, among other details such
as Control Registers. This outcome is because Microsoft
uses hypervisor as a hardware security mechanism, and in
VM Control Structure, there is a field for configuring this
hardware feature, called Descriptor-Table Exiting.
Descriptor-Table Exiting is declared in Intel Man-
ual [21]. This control determines whether executions of
LGDT, LIDT, LLDT, LTR, SGDT, SIDT, SLDT, and STR
cause VM exits. This declaration would be critical to the
attack model we intend to describe.
2.8. TSX Cache Attack
By the use of Intel TSX, which is a product name
for two x86 instruction set extensions, called Hardware
Lock Elision (HLE) and Restricted Transactional Memory
(RTM). [25], the initial phase of the attack is triggered.
HLE is a set of prefixes that could be added to spe-
cific instructions. These prefixes are backward-compatible.
Hence, the code, including them, also works on older
hardware platforms. On the other hand, RTM is an exten-
sion adding several instructions to the instruction set that
are used to declare regions of code that should execute as
part of a hardware transaction. Transactions can protect
a series of memory accesses that shall either all succeed
together or shall be rolled back together in case of any
error condition or concurrent access by other threads.
A RTM transaction comprises the region of the code
that is encapsulated between a pair of xbegin and xend
instructions. Instruction xbegin also provides a mecha-
nism to define a fall-back handler that is called if the
transaction is aborted and xabort can be used by the
executing code to abort the transaction explicitly. Besides,
the processor might abort the transaction upon certain
events. These events include an exception that occurs
during the transaction. In this paper, by referring to Intel
TSX, we expect RTM specifically. TSX is vital in terms
of security as it used in many side-channel attacks, and
it makes timing side-channels more precise by handling
errors in the transaction failed section (in user-mode).
By employment of the TSX, generating an exception
or an interrupt which is handled in the kernel could be
avoided, resulting in side-channel attacks more resistant
to noise and improvement in outcomes.
3. Attacks Based on GDT Access
As an indispensable part of the suggested attack, GDT
and its properties are described in detail in the this section.
3.1. Global Descriptor Table
GDT is a data structure employed by Intel x86-family
processors starting with the 80286 in order to define the
characteristics of the various memory areas used during
program execution, including the base address, the size,
and access privileges such as executability and writability.
GDT is a main table in x86 and protected-mode that
still exists in AMD64 [26] and Intel IA-32e. The GDT
structure in the x86 system is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. GDT structure in a 32-bit machine
While the proposed attack here works on both x86 and
x64 architectures, we have used the x64 version of GDT
since it is more widespread rather than the other version.
3.2. GDT in 64-bit
In the modern systems in protected-mode with paging
enabled, although the segmentation is omitted, the GDT
still presents in 64-bit mode. A GDT must be defined
but is generally never changed or used for segmenta-
tion. The size of the register has been extended from
48 to 80 bits, and 64-bit selectors are always Flat (thus,
from 0000000000000000 to FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF).
However, the base of FS and GS are not constrained to
0, and they proceed to be used as pointers to the offset
of items such as the process environment block and the
thread information block e.g., in x86 version of Windows
FS points to TEB structure for the current thread in user-
mode, and KPRCB in kernel-mode and GS have the same
usage in x64 machines.
64-bit versions of Microsoft Windows forbid hooking
of the GDT. Attempting to do so would cause the machine
to bug check. It is not a problem for our case as long
as mechanisms for preventing these hooks called Kernel
Patch Protection, which is known as PatchGuard, checkd
the system in random intervals of between 3 to 10 minutes.
So we can patch GDT in a glance then make everything
back again to avoid such errors. In this context, we use
GDT as a descriptor for call-gate to complete the attack
chain instead of a descriptor for segmentation.
Figure 4. GDT Structure in x64
3.3. Call-gate Mechanism
Call-gates are used to transfer the execution to other
rings e.g., ring 0, 1, 2, 3. Instructions like SYSENTER
and SYSCALL are used in modern operating systems for
transitioning between every rings to ring 0. But for the
transition between other rings (e.g., ring 3 to 2 or 2 to
1), the call-gates would be used. The type field located in
the GDT structure as indicated in Figure 3 represents a
4-bit field that could get various values and completely
change the GDT entry behavior and definition. So, it
could be filled with one of the values indicated in Table
1 depending on the entry’s usage [27].
TABLE 1. THE POSSIBLE VALUES FOR TYPE FIELD IN GDT
0000 Reserved
0001 Available 16-bit TSS
0010 Local Descriptor Table (LDT)
0011 Busy 16-bit TSS
0100 16-bit call-gate
0101 Task Gate
0110 16-bit Interrupt Gate
0111 16-bit Trap Gate
1000 Reserved
1001 Available 32-bit TSS
1010 Reserved
1011 Busy 32-bit TSS
1100 32-bit call-gate
1101 Reserved
1110 32-bit Interrupt Gate
1111 32-bit Trap Gate
As could be seen from the permissible values, after
finding the target entry, the type value should be changed
to one Gate accordingly. For example, we use 0xc (1100
- 32-bit call-gate) in the final payload.
There are some terms in call-gate used to build the
final payload. In order to exploit the features that call-
gate provides, the suitable privilege level should be set
in the data segmentation used in the GDT. Here are the
privilege levels defined in this context.
• Current Privilege Level (CPL) CPL is stored in
the selector of currently executing the CS register.
It represents the privilege level (PL) of the cur-
rently executing task and also PL in the descriptor
of the code segment and designated as Task Priv-
ilege Level (TPL) [27].
• Descriptor Privilege Level (DPL) It is PL of the
object which is being attempted to be accessed
by the current task or put differently, the least
privilege level for the caller to use this gate [27].
• Requester Privilege Level (RPL) It is the lowest
two bits of any selector. It can be used to weaken
the CPL if craved [27].
• Effective Privilege Level (EPL) It is maximum
of CPL and RPL thus the task becomes less priv-
ileged [27].
It is assumed that a task needs data from the data
segment. Therefore, the privilege levels are checked at
the time a selector for the target segment is loaded into
the data segment register. Three privilege levels enter into
the privilege checking mechanism. Ultimately, the payload
must meet the following conditions in the fields:
• RPL of the selector of the target segment.
• DPL of the descriptor of the target segment
Note that the access is allowed only if DPL is greater
than or equal to the maximum of CPL and RPL, and a
procedure can only access the data that is at the same or
less privilege level.
3.4. From call-gate to code Execution in Ring-0
3.4.1. Call-gate in x86. In order to use x86, fields of a
unique set of call-gate should be filled as described in
Table 2.
Selector field should be 0x8 to point to
KGDT R0 CODE entry of GDT, which describes
the kernel-mode in Windows. The type of it should be
0xc, and the minimum ring that can invoke this call-gate
is 0x3 (DPL = 0x3 (user-mode)), and also, it should be
present in memory (pFlag = 0x1) [27].
TABLE 2. ORGANIZATION OF THE FIELDS IN THE GDT
selector 0x8
type 0xc
dpl 0x3
pFlag 0x1
offset 0 15 0x0000ffff & address
offset 16 31 0x0000ffff & ( address >>16 )
3.4.2. Call-gate in Long Mode. Call-gate are unavoid-
able parts of Intel structure, and even in 64-bit long mode.
In addition to GDT, LDT is also present but special cases
like segmentation using the FS/GS segment are replaced
by the new MSR-based mechanism using IA32 GS BASE
and IA32 KERNEL GS BASE MSRs [28].
The fact that LDT & GDT are still presented in long
mode is used in Windows when the kernel uses the UMS
(User-Mode Scheduling), so Windows creates a Local
Descriptor Table if a thread tends to use UMS [29].
4. User-Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP)
UMIP is a security feature present in new Intel Pro-
cessors. If enabled, it prevents the execution of particular
instructions if the Current Privilege Level (CPL) is greater
than 0. If these instructions were executed when CPL > 0,
user space applications could have access to system-wide
settings such as the global and local descriptor tables, the
task register and the interrupt descriptor table. These are
the instructions covered by UMIP:
• SGDT : Store Global Descriptor Table
• SIDT : Store Interrupt Descriptor Table
• SLDT : Store Local Descriptor Table
• SMSW : Store Machine Status Word
• STR : Store Task Register
If any of these instructions are executed with CPL
> 0, a general protection exception (GP) is issued when
UMIP is enabled. In order to enable this feature, operating
systems can set the 11th bit of the CR4. In our obser-
vations, Linux and Windows do not use these features
for some compatibility issues. Thus, this opens a kernel
memory address leak to user-mode applications, and these
valid addresses can be used for exploiting the Operating
System Kernel or as a valid address for other side-channel
measurements. In section 5, we demonstrate how these
addresses could lead to a full system compromise.
Nevertheless, Microsoft decided to remove the support
for GDT, SIDT, SLDT, SMSW, and STR instructions in
hypervisor as explained. Our observation shows that even
if operating systems use UMIP or DESCRIPTOR-TABLE
EXITING separately or both of them simultaneously, it is
still vulnerable to side-channel attacks based on TSX.
4.1. Far Calls and Far JMPs
The far forms of JMP and CALL refer to other seg-
ments and require privilege checking. The far JMP and
CALL can be performed in two methods:
• Without call-gate Descriptor: The processor per-
mits a JMP or CALL directly to another segment
only if:
1) DPL of the target segment = CPL of the
calling segment
2) Confirming bit of the target code is set and
DPL of the target segment ≤ CPL
Note that Confirming Segment may be called from
various privilege levels, but is executed at the
privilege level of the calling procedure.
• With call-gate Descriptor: The far pointer of the
control transfer instruction uses the selector part
of the pointer and selects a gate. The selector and
offset fields of a gate form a pointer to the entry
of a procedure.
5. Attack implementation
In this section, we describe how the explored mech-
anism are used to create the attack. Then, we show the
results obtained from the Intel processor and show how
the valid base address of IDT and GDT could be obtained
without using SIDT and SGDT. Next, we show how to
build a valid call-gate entry and use it in combination
with a write-what-where to execute an adversary code.
Then attacker crafts the shellcode in ring 0 in order to
elevate privilege or hide the malware in the kernel.
5.1. Threat Model
As a basic assumption for the attack model, the at-
tacker can execute code in the victims computer in a
limited level of privilege, including a highly limited user-
mode or in a sandboxed application with all the common
defenses (e.g., SMEP, SMAP, DEP) enabled and config-
ured suitably. In order to fully compromise the system
an attacker has prior write-what-where (CWE-123) [30]
vulnerability in operating system kernel. Further, as an
extension to the proposed attack mechanism, the adversary
might also execute code in a vitalized environment as well
in the shared resource usage scenario.
5.2. Experimental Setup
The experiment to showcase the effectiveness of the
explained attack chain has been executed on a system
equipped with 9th generation of Intel processor (i9-
9880H), running on a Windows 19H1 (also known as
1903) with 16 GB of DDR4 RAM.
Moreover, the same attack procedure is carried out
on a system with a 6th generation CPU (6820HQ), to
ensure the generalization of the method. The test has also
been successfully experimented on 19H2 and the latest
20H1 Microsoft Windows, Ubuntu Debian 7, and Mac
OSX Mojave as well.
5.3. Finding GDT Address
In order to locate the GDT address, a timing measure-
ment is required to discover the elapsed time in accessing
a mapped and an unmapped address in the kernel space
memory. Experimentally, a valid address gives the re-
sponse time about 190 ∼ 197 clock-cycles (different based
on architecture) and an invalid address access returns after
about 220 ∼ 234 clock-cycles based on our results in 6th
Gen Intel (6820HQ).
To implement such a measurement, a combination of the
kernel memory address and access time (RDTSCP) + TSX
(XBEGIN, XEND) is employed. Then the response time
difference in accessing a mapped and unmapped addresses
could lead to the identification of mapped addresses.
1 rdtscp
; get the current time clock of processor
2 ... ; save the rdtscp results somewhere
(e.g registers)
3
4 mov rax,[Kernel Address] ; Move a kernel
address into tax
5 xbegin $+xxx ; Use Intel TSX in order to
suppress any error in user-mode
6 ; The error always happens because we are
trying to read kernel address
7 mov byte ptr [rax], 0 ; Try to write into
kernel address
8 ... ; Error occurs here (program never
reaches here)
9
10 xend ; End of TSX
11 rdtscp ; Compute the core clock timing again
in order to see how many
12 ; clocks CPU spends when trying too
write into our address
Listing 1. The timing measurement code deployed by the use of TSX
technology (RDTSCP)
Furthermore, if a particular processor does not support
the RDTSCP instruction, then one could get similar results
by the serialization process. More precisely, it is required
to serialize instructions to execute all of the instructions
fetched before the targeted instruction. So a combination
of CPUID + RDTSC is adequately employed. Given the
explained circumstances, the previous code could be mod-
ified as follows in Listing 2:
2 cpuid ;Execute a serialization instruction
3 rdtsc
; get the current time clock of processor
4 ... ; save the rdtsc results somewhere (
e.g registers)
5
6 mov rax,[Kernel Address] ; Move a kernel
address into tax
7 xbegin $+xxx ; Use Intel TSX in order to
suppress any error in user-mode
8 ; The error always happens
because we are trying to read kernel address
9 mov byte ptr [rax], 0 ; Try to write into
kernel address
10 ... ; Error occurs here (program never
reaches here)
11
12 xend ; End of TSX
13 rdtsc ; Compute the core clock timing again
in order to see how many
14 ; clocks CPU spends when trying too
write into our address
Listing 2. The timing measurement code by serialization of instructions
(RDTSC+CPUID)
Note that the first implementation indeed gives more
precise results compared to executing RDTSC. Our exper-
iments show that it is not suitable to use CPUID for the
second RDTSC as it takes several clocks-cycles.
Furthermore, it would be possible to use the tim-
ing thread, if a operating system prohibits the usage of
RDTSC or RDTCSP [31], or intercepts the execution of
CPUID using Intel VMX [32] or Intel FlexMigration [33].
Timing threads could even have a higher resolution rather
than RDTSC/RDTCSP on many processors [34] [35].
By deploying these instructions, an automatic process is
triggered to find valid targeted addresses.
The result consists of four valid elements. The first
one is the addresses that are valid for IDT. Second
is the address of GDT, and third is the address of
SYSCALL MSR LSTAR (0xC0000082) - (The kernel’s
RIP SYSCALL entry for 64-bit software) [36]. Finally, the
fourth is where the page tables are mapped. The timing
results of the deployed measuring method is depicted in
Figure 5.
Our observation in the latest 20H1 (and other ver-
sions of Windows) shows that GDT and IDT are
Figure 5. The results of timing TSX-based measurements on a uni-core
system
mapped in a particular order, even though there is
no limitation to assign different addresses. By way
of example, Windows maps IDT in a unique ad-
dress. IDTR is fffff80021eeb000, and GDTR
fffff80021eedfb0 (GDTR = GDT Base + GDT size)
and this sequence is the same each time Windows is
restarted when the KASLR addresses changed. The dif-
ference is 0x2000 bytes or two pages. Thus, the address
of IDT could first be determined, leading to revealing the
address of GDT where another page of 0x2000 bytes is
mapped following the first valid page address.
While there are other pages mapped into memory ad-
dresses (e.g., shadow functions for system-calls and inter-
rupts), the addresses are far from the target addresses (e.g.,
fffff8001d34e500). Therefore, the address among
IDT, GDT, Interrupt Shadows, and System Call Shadows
could be identified. A payload for call-gate could build
later finding the GDT base address.
The following commands in Listing 3 shows the pro-
cess of identification of valid addresses on all the cores by
realizing the distance between GDT and IDT addresses.
2 ; Accessing First Core’s IDT and GDT
3 0: kd> r idtr
4 idtr=fffff8077925b000
5 0: kd> r gdtr
6 gdtr=fffff8077925dfb0
7 ; Accessing Second Core’s IDT and GDT
8 0: kd> ∼1
9 1: kd> r idtr
10 idtr=ffff8401bc053000
11 1: kd> r gdtr
12 gdtr=ffff8401bc055fb0
13 ; Accessing Third Core’s IDT and GDT
14 1: kd> ∼2
15 2: kd> r idtr
16 idtr=ffff8401bc0f5000
17 2: kd> r gdtr
18 gdtr=ffff8401bc0f7fb0
19 ; Accessing Forth Core’s IDT and GDT
20 2: kd> ∼3
21 3: kd> r idtr
22 idtr=ffff8401bc1a4000
23 3: kd> r gdtr
24 gdtr=ffff8401bc1a6fb0
Listing 3. The procedure of employing IDTR and GDTR
We observed that allocated addresses for IDT and
GDT have a special pattern for each core. For instance,
here are several addresses that Windows allocated for IDT
of its first core:
• fffff8036385b000
• fffff8027ca5b000
• fffff80053a5b000
• fffff8076525b000
Our experiments indicate that these addresses tend to
follow a specific pattern. As the pseudo-code illus-
trated in Listing 3, the GDT has the same pattern As
IDT as well. Our experiments show that, regardless of
the system in hand, for the first core, the pattern of
fffff80XXXX5b000 is spotted, where XXXX can be
changed due to the prevention mechanism of KASLR. The
first bytes in the pattern address is to create a canonical
address, and the least significant byte has a constant value
of 5b000 pattern. This brings 0xffff = 65535 possibilities
to find the address of IDT and GDT in the first core
of Windows. The same pattern can be applied to other
cores as well. In a uni-core system, one can test up to 10
addresses per second with excellent precision, using the
explained timing side-channel. Moreover, one could also
hasten this measurement up to 20 addresses per second,
in compromise to the loss of accuracy. Approximately, it
takes 109 minutes to find the address of the GDT for the
first core. Of course, the patterns for other cores could be
discovered as well. As an example, in the 8-core system,
there are eight possibilities for IDT and GDT addresses,
which could speed up the search 8x faster. Also, it is
possible to use other cores simultaneously for accelerating
the search process.
5.4. Build call-gate Entry
We have built our payload based on the description
discussed in section 3.4.
5.5. Using FAR JMPs, FAR CALLs
As explored in section 4.1, the near forms of JMP and
CALL transfer within the current code segment requires
only limited checking. However, the far forms of JMP
and CALL are referred to as other segments and require
privilege checking.
Hence, when the CPU fetches a far-call instruction,
it will use that instructions selector value to look up a
descriptor in the GDT (or in the current LDT). If the call-
gate descriptor is fetched, and if access is allowed (i.e.,
if CPL ≤ DPL), then the CPU will perform a complex
sequence of actions which will accomplish the requested
ring-transition. CPL is based on the least significant 2-bits
in register CS (also in SS).
The new value for SS:SP comes from a special system-
segment, known as the TSS (Task State Segment). The
CPU locates its TSS by referring to the value in register
TR (Task Register).
5.6. Returning back to the user-mode
After the call-gate is executed in kernel-mode, and we
run shellcode in kernel-mode, it is time to return to the
user-mode in order to avoid a crash in kernel-mode like
BSOD in Windows or Kernel Panic in Linux.
In order to return to user-mode or any other outer ring
that is used as the source of FAR CALL or FAR JMP,
one should execute lret instruction in the inner ring. It is
analogous to the procedure when an interrupt is returned
to the previous state.
1) Use the far-return instruction: lret
• Restores CS:IP from the current stack
• Restores SS:SP from the current stack
2) Use the far-return instruction: lret $n
• Restores CS:IP from the current stack
• Discards n parameter-bytes from that stack
• Restores SS:SP from that current stack
5.7. Combining attack with CWE-123
CWE-123 stands for write-what-where bugs. We have
employed CVE-2016-7255 to modify our specific GDT
entries. Consequently, the kernel-mode code execution of
the shell-code using a FAR CALL is achieved. Also,
another effect of this attack is to change the supervisor bit
of page table so that page tables are readable and writable
in user-mode or self-ref of death attack).
6. Possible Mitigation
The simple approach of complete isolation of the
kernel is not able to fully unmap GDT from the user-mode
since, in all modes of execution, the GDT descriptors
should be available.
Every segment register has a visible part and a hidden
part. The hidden part sometimes referred to a descriptor
cache or a shadow register. When a segment selector is
loaded into the visible part of a segment register, the pro-
cessor also loads the hidden part of the segment register
with the base address, segment limit, and access control
information from the segment descriptor pointed to by the
segment selector. The information cached in the segment
register (visible and hidden) allows the processor to trans-
late addresses without taking extra bus cycles to read the
base address and limit from the segment descriptor. In
systems in which multiple processors have access to the
same descriptor tables, it is the responsibility of software
to reload the segment registers when the descriptor tables
are modified. Otherwise, an old segment descriptor cached
in a segment register might be used after its memory-
resident version has been modified [21].
It is worthy of mentioning that, complete mitigation
to this attack would be the employment of separate GDT
base in kernel and user layout. The kernel GDT should
not be mapped into the user-mode, and Operating System
Kernel has to change the address of GDTR each time a
ring modification occurs. For example, it shall use SGDT
to change the GDTR after every user-mode to kernel-
mode switch caused by SYSENTER and SYSCALL or every
interrupts handler routines.
The mapped GDT in the user-mode should also be
modifiable only by the kernel (not user-mode).
Hence, the user-mode application cannot access a valid
address for GDT, and the discovered GDT address by the
attacker is only valid when it is on user-mode. So, if a
bug such as Write-What-Where occurs in the kernel or any
system-level driver or kernel module, it cannot modify the
user-mode GDT; thus, if the user-mode application tries
to use call-gate in ring 3, the corresponding GDT entry is
invalid, and the attack fails.
7. Related Efforts
Micro-architectural software attacks have been widely
investigated in the context of revealing or damaging pri-
vate and sensitive data. Recent works such as [37]–[39]
aim to discover data on the victim system secretly. Fur-
thermore, adversary techniques for exploitation on shared
Virtual Environments like [40] have shown to be promis-
ing in practice.
With regards to much older timing side-channel at-
tacks, Osvik et al. [41] introduced the PRIME+PROBE
on the L1 cache, to attack the AES implementations,
discovering secret keys. Consequently, more promising
and sophisticated methods like [37] were proposed.
Moreover, other software-based attacks on DRAM
pioneered by [11] have also shown to be very practical,
jeopardizing the private data stored in memory systems in
various circumstances.
In terms of exploiting the abandoned, but existing
technologies in modern CPU designs, which is the primary
concern of this paper, the possible vulnerabilities regard-
ing the structure of GDT and IDT, were previously studied
by [42]. Researchers in [42] proposed a technique to gain
a more stable kernel-level exploitation. These techniques
were shown to be applicable in Windows-NT systems.
Moreover, interestingly, several utilized mechanisms in
this article, such as call-gate has also been used for secur-
ing the systems. For instance, [43] present an approach to
prevent sandbox leakage based on call-gate.
8. Conclusion and Discussion
The impact of the hardware vulnerability exploited by
software techniques has been proved to be dreadful. In
this paper, we presented a TSX based side-channel attack,
revealing the addresses of GDT and IDT in the kernel
space, which could be exploited by an arbitrary user-
mode application. We demonstrated that a single Write-
What-Where vulnerability in the operating system could
lead to a full system compromise through call-gate feature
available in today’s CPUs, irrespective of the version of
the operating system. We have successfully evaluated our
method by implementing an attack on the 9th Generation
Intel processors.
The attack presented here is based on the descriptor
structures available on the modern processors (e.g., Intel
as well as AMD [26]) although have hidden address
by ASLR but are mapped into the user-mode address
layout. The exploitation perfectly works with common
Write What Where bugs. For instance, any bug in a
JavaScript application on an isolated web-browser in the
kernel address or graphic functions of the operating sys-
tem (e.g., Win32k bugs in Windows) will be enough to
be exploited. Moreover, we suggested software mitigation
for this vulnerability since the presented attack bypasses
the recent mitigation to Meltdown Attack (e.g., KAISER).
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